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The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing

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  • Lin, Y Joseph
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    Abstract

    Using the dampening-of-competition approach to understanding vertical relationships, this paper shows that, in the absence of intrabrand retailer competition, firms earn greater profits using exclusive dealing. The paper explains the frequent simultaneous appearance of exclusive dealing and exclusive territoriality. The results are used to analyze the famous 1949 Standard Stations case. The author concludes that the 1949 Court did the right thing for a wrong reason. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 39 (1990)
    Issue (Month): 2 (December)
    Pages: 209-23

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:39:y:1990:i:2:p:209-23

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    Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

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    Cited by:
    1. José J. Sempere Monerris & Rafael Moner Colonques & Amparo Urbano, 2001. "Equilibrium Distribution Systems Under Retailers' Strategic Behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. MAULEON, Ana & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, Jose & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 2005. "Networks of manufacturers and retailers," CORE Discussion Papers 2005041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Nigel Driffield, 1999. "Regulation of the Petrol Industry in the UK: Issues and Evidence," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(3), pages 349-365.
    4. Martin Peitz & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "- Intermediation Can Replace Certification," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, 2013. "Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond," Working Papers 2013-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    6. Rafael MONER-COLONQUES & José J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Amparo URBANO, 2002. "The Manufacturers’ Choice of Brand Policy under Successive Duopoly," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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