Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion
AbstractRivalry in the Vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game. Service-station demand, cost, and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual station prices, costs, and sales. These functions are then used to calculate noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the constitutent game and the actual outcome of the repeated game. The actual outcome is found to be substantially less lucrative than the monopoly solution. Nevertheless, all stations are better off than if they played their noncooperative strategies in every period. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 35 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.