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Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

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  • PAUL BROCKMAN
  • XIUMIN MARTIN
  • EMRE UNLU
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    Abstract

    Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. We also find that short-maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and delta-related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk. Copyright (c) 2010 The American Finance Association.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

    Volume (Year): 65 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (06)
    Pages: 1123-1161

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:65:y:2010:i:3:p:1123-1161

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    Cited by:
    1. Alderson, Michael J. & Bansal, Naresh & Betker, Brian L., 2014. "CEO turnover and the reduction of price sensitivity," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 376-386.
    2. Liu, Yixin & Mauer, David C., 2011. "Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 183-198, October.
    3. Liu, Yixin & Mauer, David C. & Zhang, Yilei, 2014. "Firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 83-100.
    4. Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2013. "Do Measures of Financial Constraints Measure Financial Constraints?," NBER Working Papers 19551, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jeong-Bon Kim & Li Li & Mary L. Z. Ma & Frank M. Song, 2013. "CEO Option Compensation, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry," Working Papers 182013, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    6. Drobetz, Wolfgang & von Meyerinck, Felix & Oesch, David & Schmid, Markus, . "Is Board Industry Experience a Corporate Governance Mechanism?," Working Papers on Finance 1401, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    7. Kabir, Rezaul & Li, Hao & Veld-Merkoulova, Yulia V., 2013. "Executive compensation and the cost of debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 2893-2907.
    8. Shen, Carl Hsin-han & Zhang, Hao, 2013. "CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1176-1194.
    9. Beladi, Hamid & Quijano, Margot, 2013. "CEO incentives for risk shifting and its effect on corporate bank loan cost," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 182-188.
    10. Colonnello, Stefano & Curatola, Giuliano & Ngoc Giang Hoang, 2014. "Executive compensation structure and credit spreads," SAFE Working Paper Series 60, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    11. Custódio, Cláudia & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Laureano, Luís, 2013. "Why are US firms using more short-term debt?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 182-212.

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