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Collateral Spread and Financial Development

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  • JOSÉ M. LIBERTI
  • ATIF R. MIAN

Abstract

We show that institutions that promote financial development ease borrowing constraints by lowering the collateral spread and shifting the composition of acceptable collateral towards firm-specific assets. Collateral spread is defined as the difference in collateralization rates between high- and low-risk borrowers. The average collateral spread is large but declines rapidly with improvements in financial development driven by stronger institutions. We also show that the composition of collateralizable assets shifts towards non-specific assets (e.g., land) with borrower risk. However, the shift is considerably smaller in developed financial markets, enabling risky borrowers to use a larger variety of assets as collateral. Copyright (c) 2009 the American Finance Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 65 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 147-177

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:65:y:2010:i:1:p:147-177

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Cited by:
  1. Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "The de Soto Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers 7259, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Kislat, Carmen & Menkhoff, Lukas & Neuberger, Doris, 2013. "The use of collateral in formal and informal lending," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79765, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Toni Beutler & Mathieu Grobéty, 2011. "The Collateral Channel under Imperfect Debt Enforcement," Working Papers 11.11, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
  4. Benmelech, Efraim & Bergman, Nittai K., 2011. "Vintage capital and creditor protection," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 308-332, February.
  5. Cerqueiro, Geraldo & Ongena, Steven & Roszbach, Kasper, 2012. "Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Paper Series 257, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  6. Nguyen, Ha & Qian, Rong, 2012. "The cross-country magnitude and determinants of collateral borrowing," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6001, The World Bank.
  7. Lukas Menkhoff & Doris Neuberger & Ornsiri Rungruxsirivorn, 2011. "Collateral and its Substitutes in Emerging Markets' Lending," CESifo Working Paper Series 3585, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Cyril Durand & Marek Rutkowski, 2013. "CVA for Bilateral Counterparty Risk under Alternative Settlement Conventions," Papers 1307.6486, arXiv.org.
  9. Christophe Godlewski & Laurent Weill, 2011. "Does Collateral Help Mitigate Adverse Selection? A Cross-Country Analysis," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 49-78, October.
  10. Juliano J. Assunção & Efraim Benmelech & Fernando S. S. Silva, 2012. "Repossession and the Democratization of Credit," NBER Working Papers 17858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Yaldız Hanedar, Elmas & Broccardo, Eleonora & Bazzana, Flavio, 2014. "Collateral requirements of SMEs: The evidence from less-developed countries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 106-121.
  12. Hainz, Christa & Dinh, Thanh & Kleimeier, Stefanie, 2011. "Collateral and its Determinants: Evidence from Vietnam," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 36, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  13. Love, Inessa & Peria, Maria Soledad Martinez & Singh, Sandeep, 2013. "Collateral registries for movable assets : does their introduction spur firms'access to bank finance ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6477, The World Bank.

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