AbstractUsing a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes-even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower "abnormal" CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms. Copyright (c) 2009 the American Finance Association.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 64 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Morgan, Angela & Poulsen, Annette & Wolf, Jack & Yang, Tina, 2011. "Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 914-928, September.
- Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, 2013. "Say on pay laws, executive compensation, CEO pay slice, and firm value around the world," International Finance Discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 1084, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Matvos, Gregor & Ostrovsky, Michael, 2010. "Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 90-112, October.
- Fischer, Paul E. & Gramlich, Jeffrey D. & Miller, Brian P. & White, Hal D., 2009. "Investor perceptions of board performance: Evidence from uncontested director elections," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 172-189, December.
- Sandra Cavaco & Patricia Crifo & Antoine Reberioux & Gwenael Roudaut, 2014.
"Independent directors: less informed, but better selected? New evidence from a two-way director-firm fixed effect model,"
- Sandra Cavaco & Patricia Crifo & Antoine Rebérioux & Gwenaël Roudaut, 2014. "Independent directors: less informed, but better selected? New evidence from a two-way director-firm fixed effect model," CIRANO Working Papers 2014s-39, CIRANO.
- Ertimur, Yonca & Ferri, Fabrizio & Maber, David A., 2012. "Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 118-144.
- Stephen G. Dimmock & William C. Gerken & Zoran Ivković & Scott J. Weisbenner, 2014. "Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices," NBER Working Papers 20176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Li, Feng & Srinivasan, Suraj, 2011. "Corporate governance when founders are directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 454-469.
- Larcker, David F. & McCall, Allan L. & Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2012. "The Economic Consequences of Proxy Advisor Say-on-Pay Voting Policies," Research Papers 2105, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Pablo Ruiz-VerdÃº & Ravi Singh, 2014. "Board Independence, CEO Pay, and Camouflaged Compensation," Business Economics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa wb140704, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Cai, Jay & Garner, Jacqueline L. & Walkling, Ralph A., 2013. "A paper tiger? An empirical analysis of majority voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 119-135.
- Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.
- Larcker, David F. & McCall, Allan L. & Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2013. "Proxy advisory firms and stock option repricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 149-169.
- Ferri, Fabrizio & Oesch, David, . "Management Influence on Investors: Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay," Working Papers on Finance 1329, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
- David Yermack & Yuanzhi Li, 2014. "Evasive Shareholder Meetings," NBER Working Papers 19991, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Masulis, Ronald W. & Wang, Cong & Xie, Fei, 2012. "Globalizing the boardroomâ€”The effects of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 527-554.
- Daines, Robert M. & Gow, Ian D. & Larcker, David F., 2010. "Rating the ratings: How good are commercial governance ratings?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 439-461, December.
- Sharma, Vineeta, 2011. "Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1001-1015, September.
- Wagner, Alexander F., 2011. "Board independence and competence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 71-93, January.
- Brochet, Francois & Srinivasan, Suraj, 2014. "Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 430-449.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.