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Leverage and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers

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Author Info

  • Assem Safieddine

    (Eli Broad Graduate School of Management, Michigan State University,)

  • Sheridan Titman

    (University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

This paper finds that, on average, targets that terminate takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Targets that increase their leverage ratios the most reduce capital expenditures, sell assets, reduce employment, increase focus, and realize cash flows and share prices that outperform their benchmarks in the five years following the failed takeover. Our evidence suggests that leverage-increasing targets act in the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be made by potential raiders. Copyright The American Finance Association 1999.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal The Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 54 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 547-580

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:54:y:1999:i:2:p:547-580

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Cited by:
  1. Goldman, Eitan & Qian, Jun, 2005. "Optimal toeholds in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 321-346, August.
  2. Ruben Arrondo & Silvia Gomez-Anson, 2003. "A study of Spanish firms' security issue decision under asymmetric information and agency costs," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(10), pages 771-782.
  3. Hunjra, Ahmed Imran & Bilal, Muhammad & Shafi, Haroon & Ullah, Ikram & Rehman, Kashif-Ur-, 2010. "Patterns of capital structure and dividend policy in Pakistani corporate sector and their impact on organization performance," MPRA Paper 40658, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Adams, John C. & Mansi, Sattar A., 2009. "CEO turnover and bondholder wealth," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 522-533, March.
  5. N. Chidambaran & Kose John & Zhaoyun Shangguan & Gopala Vasudevan, 2010. "Hot and cold merger markets," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 327-349, April.
  6. El-Hussein E. El-Masry & Jacqueline L. Reck, 2008. "Continuous online auditing as a response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 23(8), pages 779-802, September.
  7. Jorge Farinha & Francisco Miranda, 2003. "Run-up, toeholds, and agency effects in mergers and acquisitions: evidence from an emerging market," CEF.UP Working Papers 0311, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  8. Joseph P. Hughes & Choon-Geol Moon & William W. Lang & Michael S. Pagano, 2001. "Managerial Incentives and the Efficiency of Capital Structure," Departmental Working Papers 200102, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  9. Kose John & Ravi S. Mateti & Zhaoyun Shangguan & Gopala Vasudevan, 2013. "Does overvaluation of bidder stock drive acquisitions? The case of public and private targets," International Journal of Banking, Accounting and Finance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 5(1/2), pages 188-204.
  10. Ryngaert, Michael & Scholten, Ralph, 2010. "Have changing takeover defense rules and strategies entrenched management and damaged shareholders? The case of defeated takeover bids," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 16-37, February.
  11. Racic, Stanko, 2010. "Is Japanese management superior? Evidence from the performance of the USA targets in partial acquisitions," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 14-34, February.
  12. Devos, Erik & Dhillon, Upinder & Jagannathan, Murali & Krishnamurthy, Srinivasan, 2012. "Why are firms unlevered?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 664-682.
  13. van Bommel, Jos & Vermaelen, Theo, 2003. "Post-IPO capital expenditures and market feedback," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 275-305, February.
  14. Bhanot, Karan & Mansi, Sattar A. & Wald, John K., 2010. "Takeover risk and the correlation between stocks and bonds," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 381-393, June.
  15. Karyn L. Neuhauser & Wallace N. Davidson III & John L. Glascock, 2011. "An analysis of failed takeover attempts and merger cancellations," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 7(4), pages 347-376, September.
  16. Espahbodi, Hassan & Espahbodi, Pouran, 2003. "Binary choice models and corporate takeover," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 549-574, April.
  17. Alderson, Michael J. & Betker, Brian L., 2006. "The specification and power of tests to detect abnormal changes in corporate investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 738-760, September.
  18. Jandik, Tomas & Makhija, Anil K., 2004. "Debt, Debt Structure and Corporate Performance after Unsuccessful Takeovers: Evidence from Targets that Remain Independent," Working Paper Series 2005-6, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  19. Zhu, PengCheng & Jog, Vijay & Otchere, Isaac, 2011. "Partial acquisitions in emerging markets: A test of the strategic market entry and corporate control hypotheses," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 288-305, April.
  20. Jandik, Tomas & Makhija, Anil K., 2005. "The Impact of the Structure of Debt on Target Gains," Working Paper Series 2005-5, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  21. Howell, Jann C. & Stover, Roger D., 2002. "How much do governance and managerial behavior matter in investment decisions? Evidence from failed thrift auctions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 195-211, July.
  22. Krishnan, C.N.V. & Masulis, Ronald W. & Thomas, Randall S. & Thompson, Robert B., 2012. "Shareholder litigation in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1248-1268.
  23. Jandik, Tomas & Makhija, Anil K., 2005. "Debt, debt structure and corporate performance after unsuccessful takeovers: evidence from targets that remain independent," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 882-914, October.
  24. Otchere, Isaac & Ip, Edwina, 2006. "Intra-industry effects of completed and cancelled cross border acquisitions in Australia: A test of the acquisition probability hypothesis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 209-230, April.
  25. Joseph P. Hughes & William W. Lang & Choon-Geol Moon & Michael S. Pagano, 2004. "Managerial Incentives and the Efficiency of Capital Structure in U.S. Commercial Banking," Departmental Working Papers 200401, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.

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