Impact of the 1988 Basle Accord on International Banks
AbstractThe ostensible purpose of the Basle Accord was to standardize bank-capital regulations among the twelve leading industrial countries. Its ulterior goal was to 'level the playing field' by eliminating a funding-cost advantage of Japanese banks that had allowed them to capture more than one-third of international lending. The wealth gain for Japanese bank shareholders was 31.63 percent. Wealth effects for shareholders of non-Japanese banks were not significant. These results suggest that the Baste Accord did not eliminate the pricing advantage of Japanese banks, challenging the non-Japanese regulators' contention that the regulation would help level the playing field. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
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