This paper presents an information-theoretic model of initial public offering pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the initial public offering and the secondary market, have private information about their firm's prospects, and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm. High-value firms, knowing they are going to pool wit h low-value firms, induce outsiders to engage in information productio n by underpricing, which compensates outsiders for the cost of produci ng information. The information is reflected in the secondary market pr ice of equity, giving a higher expected stock price for high-value firms. Copyright 1993 by American Finance Association.
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Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 48 (1993) Issue (Month): 1 (March) Pages: 285-304 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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