IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jecrev/v58y2007i3p407-416.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Quality Differentiation, Welfare, And The Mode Of Competition In A Vertically Differentiated Product Market: A Note

Author

Listed:
  • TSUYOSHI TOSHIMITSU
  • NAOTO JINJI

Abstract

We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.

Suggested Citation

  • Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu & Naoto Jinji, 2007. "Quality Differentiation, Welfare, And The Mode Of Competition In A Vertically Differentiated Product Market: A Note," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 58(3), pages 407-416, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:58:y:2007:i:3:p:407-416
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00357.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00357.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2007.00357.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ya‐chin Wang & Leonard F.s. Wang, 2009. "Equivalence Of Competition Mode In A Vertically Differentiated Duopoly With Delegation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(4), pages 577-590, December.
    2. Li, Youping, 2014. "Price leadership in a vertically differentiated market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 67-70.
    3. Gérard Mondello, 2012. "Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 232-251, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:58:y:2007:i:3:p:407-416. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/jeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.