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Intergovernmental Transfers, Governance Structure and Fiscal Decentralization

Author

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  • Motohiro Sato

Abstract

We provide a model incorporating features of local public finance in Japan, including close fiscal ties between different levels of government as well as bureaucratic determinations of intergovernmental transfers. The discretionary nature of transfers softens local budgets ex post, which exerts perverse incentive effects on local governments ex ante. Fiscal decentralization that assigns more revenue responsibility to the local level serves to counteract this moral hazard incentive. The emphasis is on the endogenous nature of regional fiscal capacities at the local level. Fiscal devolution motivates local jurisdictions to become fiscally independent wherever possible. JEL Classification Number: H7.

Suggested Citation

  • Motohiro Sato, 2002. "Intergovernmental Transfers, Governance Structure and Fiscal Decentralization," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 53(1), pages 55-76, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:53:y:2002:i:1:p:55-76
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5876.00213
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    Cited by:

    1. Kimiko Terai & Amihai Glazer, 2014. "Budgets under Delegation," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2014-007, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    2. James Foreman-Peck & Laurian Lungu, 2009. "Fiscal devolution and dependency," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(7), pages 815-828.
    3. Grasa, Rafael & Camps, Arnau, 2009. "Conflict Prevention and Decentralized Governance," MPRA Paper 18877, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Toshihiro Ihori, 2008. "Overlapping Tax Revenue, Local Debt Control and Soft-Budget Constraint," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-552, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 2017. "The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1348-1380, December.
    6. Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori, 2006. "Soft-Budget Constraints and Local Expenditures," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-422, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    7. Eiji Fujii, 2017. "Government Size, Trade Openness, and Output Volatility: A Case of fully Integrated Economies," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 661-684, September.
    8. Sharma, Chanchal Kumar, 2008. "Emerging Dimensions Of Decentralization Debate In The Age Of Glocalization," MPRA Paper 6734, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Mitsuhiko Kataoka & Kodrat Wibowo, 2014. "Decentralization and Spatial Allocation Policy of Public Investment in Indonesia and Japan," Working Papers in Economics and Development Studies (WoPEDS) 201403, Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University, revised Feb 2014.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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