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Monetary Policy Design: Institutional Developments from a Contractual Perspective

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  • Carl E. Walsh

Abstract

Twenty years ago, most industrialized economies were just starting the costly process of disinflation. There was little consensus that these disinflations would be successful, or that low inflation once achieved could be maintained. While the USA achieved low inflation without changing its policy making institutions, many other countries did reform their central banking institutions, making them more independent of political influences. In this paper, I address three questions. First, is independence enough? Second, how do the details of an institution's structure translate, through their impact on incentives, into different policy outcomes? And third, can institutions serve as commitment mechanisms?

Suggested Citation

  • Carl E. Walsh, 2000. "Monetary Policy Design: Institutional Developments from a Contractual Perspective," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 375-389, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:375-389
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-2362.00057
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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
    5. Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.

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