IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ijethy/v15y2019i4p341-359.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

R&D in a duopoly under incomplete information

Author

Listed:
  • Rittwik Chatterjee
  • Srobonti Chattopadhyay
  • Tarun Kabiraj

Abstract

The availability of information about rivals may have a significant impact on a firm's decision about R&D investment. This paper investigates how the R&D incentive of a firm in a Cournot duopoly may depend on information structures. We show that asymmetric information about the rival's cost reduction may enhance the research incentive of each firm compared to the complete‐information case. However, an additional dimension of asymmetry (e.g. the information about whether the rival has invested in R&D or not) will reduce the R&D incentive unambiguously compared to the one‐dimensional asymmetry case.

Suggested Citation

  • Rittwik Chatterjee & Srobonti Chattopadhyay & Tarun Kabiraj, 2019. "R&D in a duopoly under incomplete information," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 341-359, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:15:y:2019:i:4:p:341-359
    DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12174
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12174
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ijet.12174?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kyung Hwan Baik & Sang-Kee Kim, 2020. "Observable versus unobservable R&D investments in duopolies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 37-66, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:15:y:2019:i:4:p:341-359. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1742-7355 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.