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Inclusive Biomedical Innovation during the COVID‐19 Pandemic

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  • Jaspreet Pannu

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  • Jaspreet Pannu, 2020. "Inclusive Biomedical Innovation during the COVID‐19 Pandemic," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(5), pages 647-649, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:glopol:v:11:y:2020:i:5:p:647-649
    DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12876
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Kremer, 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(4), pages 1137-1167.
    2. Kremer, Michael R., 1998. "Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation," Scholarly Articles 3693705, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Michael Kremer & Jonathan Levin & Christopher M. Snyder, 2020. "Advance Market Commitments: Insights from Theory and Experience," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 110, pages 269-273, May.
    4. Helen Gubby, 2020. "Is the Patent System a Barrier to Inclusive Prosperity? The Biomedical Perspective," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(1), pages 46-55, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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