Corporate Governance and Asset Sales: The Effect of Internal and External Control Mechanisms
AbstractWe investigate firms that sell assets to determine whether corporate governance mechanisms are effective at controlling agency problems. Our evidence shows that these firms have lower managerial ownership and are more likely to make unrelated acquisitions, suggesting weak internal controls. Analysis of insider trading activity shows that, on average, net buying increases before the asset sale and shareholders benefit more when this occurs. Results suggest that how managers reach a given level of ownership provides more information about incentive alignment than just the level of ownership. Our results also highlight the dynamic nature of corporate restructuring as firms acquire and then sell assets. Copyright 2006, The Eastern Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Eastern Finance Association in its journal Financial Review.
Volume (Year): 41 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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- Pascal Nguyen, 2013. "The role of firm performance in the market reaction to divestiture announcements," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 1723-1728.
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