This paper examines the market reaction to three different events related to allegations of price-fixing: the initial charges, the firm's plea, and the resolution of the case. Negative, risk-adjusted shareholder returns are associated with the initial charge of price-fixing, while mixed results are observed during the two days immediately after the plea. The ultimate resolution of the case appears to be anticipated by the market. The overall decline in shareholder wealth from all three events combined is about 5 percent. These results suggest that shareholders are at least partial beneficiaries of price-fixing and that the presumption of an agency problem may be incorrect. Copyright 1990 by MIT Press.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Eastern Finance Association in its journal The Financial Review.
Volume (Year): 25 (1990) Issue (Month): 1 (February) Pages: 153-63 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF