Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker
AbstractThis paper develops a model of monetary policy in which the central banker can acquire costly information about a supply shock. It is shown that, with this assumption, it may be optimal for society to delegate to a "weight-liberal" central banker, a result which contrasts with that of Rogoff (1985). This result points at a limitation of Rogoff's argument. It may also explain why the issue of delegating monetary policy to an independent and "weight-conservative" central banker often is politically controversial. Copyright 2001 Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics and Politics.
Volume (Year): 13 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
Other versions of this item:
- Johan Lagerlöf, 1999. "Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-18, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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- Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003.
"Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johan Lagerl–f, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, 03.
- Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Are We Better Off If Our Politicians Have More Information?," Public Economics 0209001, EconWPA.
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