Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Institutions and Growth Volatility

Contents:

Author Info

  • Nejat Anbarci
  • Jonathan Hill
  • Hasan Kirmanoglu

Abstract

Growth volatility is a major factor that retards growth. Recent studies that link democracy and volatility can not account for a link between democracy and investment volatility. Here, instead, we focus on a specific channel that links individualistism and low volatility. Unlike an individualistic society, in a collectivistic society agents choose to invest together or choose not to invest together. We construct a two-equation system of investment and income growth volatility. We find individualism significantly directly and indirectly influences volatility negatively. We also find that, unlike individualism, democracy’s influence on investment depends on the measure of democracy and econometric specification used.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The Economic Society of Australia in its journal Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 30 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
Pages: 233-252

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:30:y:2011:i:2:p:233-252

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Central Council Administration, L.P.O. Box 2161, Hawthorn VIC 3122
Phone: 61 3 9497 4140
Fax: 61 3 9497 4140
Email:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0812-0439
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0812-0439

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A, 2004. "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 4458, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Philippe Aghion & Philippe Bacchetta & Abhijit Banerjee, 1999. "Capital Markets and the Instability of Open Economies," Working Papers 99.01, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
  3. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-50, October.
  4. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, 03.
  5. Denizer, Cevdet & Iyigun, Murat F. & Owen, Ann L., 2000. "Finance and macroeconomic volatility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2487, The World Bank.
  6. Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They are and How to Acquire Them," NBER Working Papers 7540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Mirman, Leonard J, 1971. "Uncertainty and Optimal Consumption Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(1), pages 179-85, January.
  8. Ross Levine, 1997. "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 688-726, June.
  9. Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth Lee Sokoloff, 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies," JOURNAL OF LACEA ECONOMIA, LACEA - LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.
  10. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  11. King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, 1993. "Finance and growth : Schumpeter might be right," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1083, The World Bank.
  12. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December.
  13. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
  14. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472 Elsevier.
  15. Philippe Aghion & Abhijit Banerjee & Thomas Piketty, 1999. "Dualism And Macroeconomic Volatility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1359-1397, November.
  16. King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, 1993. "Finance and growth : Schumpeter might be right," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1083, The World Bank.
  17. North, Douglass C., 1993. "Economic Performance through Time," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1993-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
  18. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2000. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 7771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Schmidt, Peter, 1977. "Estimation of seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal numbers of observations," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 365-377, May.
  20. Garey Ramey & Valerie A. Ramey, 1994. "Cross-Country Evidence on the Link Between Volatility and Growth," NBER Working Papers 4959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Levine, Ross & Renelt, David, 1991. "A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 609, The World Bank.
  22. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2009. "Political institutions and economic volatility," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 311-326, September.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00575021 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Vatcharin Sirimaneetham, 2006. "Explaining policy volatility in developing countries," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 06/583, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  4. Marc Sangnier, 2012. "Does Trust Favor Macroeconomic Stability?," AMSE Working Papers 1227, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econpa:v:30:y:2011:i:2:p:233-252. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.