IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/econom/v67y2000i266p153-176.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Amnesties, Settlements and Optimal Tax Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Luigi Alberto Franzoni

Abstract

This paper develops a model of tax enforcement in which the tax agency has discretionary power to make pre‐audit settlement offers. Settlements can take the form of either general amnesties or individual deals. It is shown that pre‐audit settlements allow the agency to overcome its limited control over the enforcement parameters (the agency takes the tax and penalty levels as given) and to increase net revenue. Amnesties prove to be superior to individual deals since they allow the agency not only to extract from taxpayers their defence costs, but also to reduce an excessive tax differential.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 2000. "Amnesties, Settlements and Optimal Tax Enforcement," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(266), pages 153-176, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:67:y:2000:i:266:p:153-176
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00202
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00202
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1468-0335.00202?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:67:y:2000:i:266:p:153-176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.