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Asset Forfeiture As A Law Enforcement Tool

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas J. Miceli
  • Derek Johnson

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="coep12106-abs-0001"> This article examines the impact on deterrence of laws that allow the seizure of assets used in the commission of a crime but owned by someone other than the offender. The results suggest that forfeiture can be used effectively, in combination with more standard tools (criminal fines or imprisonment), as a deterrent under certain conditions, but the risk of overuse is real. In particular, complete forfeiture (seizure of the entire value of the asset) is not generally socially optimal, but when enforcers are rent-seekers who care primarily about the revenue generated by forfeiture, they will use the tool to the maximum extent allowed by law. (JEL H11, K14, K41)

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Miceli & Derek Johnson, 2016. "Asset Forfeiture As A Law Enforcement Tool," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(1), pages 119-126, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:34:y:2016:i:1:p:119-126
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/coep.2016.34.issue-1
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    Citations

    RePEc Biblio mentions

    As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
    1. > Law and Economics > Economics of Crime > Crime Prevention > Police Funding > Alternative sources

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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Baumann & Sophie Bienenstock & Tim Friehe & Maiva Ropaul, 2023. "Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 229-255, September.
    2. Imanpour, Maryam & Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Westbrock, Bastian & Unger, Brigitte & Ferwerda, Joras, 2019. "A microeconomic foundation for optimal money laundering policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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