As a typical LDC, the government of Sudan has explored several policy instruments to secure an adequate wheat supply to meet the increasing wheat demand in the country. Farmers are asked to deliver part of their domestic production at a procurement price less than that of the free market price. Consequently, farmers under-report their production and sell it to the free market at the risk of being caught cheating. A postulated model describing farmers' decisions on wheat production and the proportion sold illegally to the free market is examined using 1956-86 data. The analysis supports other findings that Sudanese government policies have discouraged production and, indeed, failed to achieve their designated goals. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University of South Australia
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Volume (Year): 32 (1993) Issue (Month): 60 (June) Pages: 161-74 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)