IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/acctfi/v59y2019i2p1341-1382.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

Author

Listed:
  • Shams Pathan
  • Peh Hwa Wong
  • Karen Benson

Abstract

We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity‐linked pay and exhibit higher pay‐performance (delta) and pay‐risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity‐linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Shams Pathan & Peh Hwa Wong & Karen Benson, 2019. "How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 59(2), pages 1341-1382, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:59:y:2019:i:2:p:1341-1382
    DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12272
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12272
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/acfi.12272?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Trinh, Vu Quang & Aljughaiman, Abdullah A. & Cao, Ngan Duong, 2020. "Fetching better deals from creditors: Board busyness, agency relationships and the bank cost of debt," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Sorin Daniliuc & Lingwei Li & Marvin Wee, 2021. "Busy directors and firm performance: a replication and extension of Hauser (2018)," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(S1), pages 1415-1423, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:59:y:2019:i:2:p:1341-1382. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaanzea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.