Human dignity in the context of prison privatization

This paper discusses the legal nature of human dignity as well as whether and in what manner it merits consideration in the prison privatization decision-making process. The first chapter grasps the complexity of the legal concept of human dignity by analyzing how it is approached - its status, roles and content - in notable international and domestic regulations, soft law, sociological and legal theories. The second chapter discusses the qualitative characteristics of the decision to privatize prisons and argues that it is primarily legal (constitutional) in nature, the importance of agent identity and its effect on conceptual permissibility of prison privatization based on the rationale theory of conceptual limitation to privatizing prisons by Dorfman and Harel, and finally, presents the institutional and human rights aspects of prison privatization as discussed by Barak-Erez and Feeley following the 2009 constitutional review decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Israel which held prison privatization to be unconstitutional. The conclusion attempts to formulate an acceptable legal definition of human dignity, gives a summary of author's opinions, and assesses the influence of presented argumentation on recommendation of prison privatization as long-term or short-term solution for addressing human rights violations with overcrowding as underlying cause.