Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies
AbstractThis article evaluates a body of recent work that uses field and natural experiments to answer the question of whether informed voters can enforce better governance. A common finding in the literature is that voter behavior is malleable and that information about the political process and politician performance improves electoral accountability. Limited availability of information thus provides one explanation for the persistence of low-quality politicians and the existence of identity politics and electoral malpractices in low-income democracies. Understanding how voters can gain access to credible sources of information and understanding how politicians react to improved information about their performance are promising avenues for future research.
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Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (09)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O50 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - General
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"Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru,"
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