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Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly

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Author Info

  • Barna Bakó

    ()
    (Corvinus University of Budapest, MTA-BCE “Lendület” Strategic Interactions Research Group, Budapest, Hungary)

  • András Kálecz-Simon

    ()
    (Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary)

Abstract

The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help collusion.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary in its journal Society and Economy.

Volume (Year): 35 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 531-538

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Handle: RePEc:aka:soceco:v:35:y:2013:i:4:p:531-538

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Related research

Keywords: strategic delegation; managerial incentives;

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