The Efficiency and Robustness of Allowance Banking in the U.S. Acid Rain Program
AbstractThis paper provides an empirical evaluation of the efficiency of allowance banking in the nationwide market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances that was created by the U.S. Acid Rain Program. We develop a model of efficient banking, select appropriate parameter values, and evaluate the efficiency of observed temporal pattern of abatement based on aggregate data from the first eight years of the Acid Rain Program. Contrary to the general opinion that banking in this program has been excessive, we find that it has been reasonably efficient. We also identify the erroneous assumptions underlying the earlier view and the conditions required for efficient banking to exist independently of changes in the counterfactual, an attribute we call robustness. These results show that firms use banking provisions in a rational and predictable way and that, at least in the US Acid Rain Program, there is no support for the often expressed concern that banked permits will be used all at once to create emissions spikes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by International Association for Energy Economics in its journal The Energy Journal.
Volume (Year): Volume 28 (2007)
Issue (Month): Number 4 ()
Other versions of this item:
- A. Denny Ellerman & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2005. "The Efficiency and Robustness of Allowance Banking in the U.S. Acid Rain Program," Working Papers 0505, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- F0 - International Economics - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- John K. Stranlund & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon, 2011.
"An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets,"
2011-01, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
- Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M., 2011. "An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 414-429.
- John K. Stranlund & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon, 2010. "An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets," Working Papers 2010-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
- Mohamed Amine Boutaba, 2009. "Investigating efficiency in the U.S sulfur dioxide permit market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 1308-1319.
- Färe, Rolf & Grosskopf, Shawna & Pasurka,, Carl A., 2013. "Tradable permits and unrealized gains from trade," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 416-424.
- Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, 2012.
"The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment,"
2012.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Schmalensee, Richard & Stavins, Robert N., 2012. "The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment," Working Paper Series rwp12-030, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Richard Schmalensee & Robert Stavins, 2012. "The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment," NBER Working Papers 18306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stavins, Robert Norman & Schmalensee, Richard, 2012. "The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment," Scholarly Articles 9368024, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, 2013. "The SO 2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 103-22, Winter.
- Matti Liski & Juan‐Pablo Montero, 2011.
"Market Power in an Exhaustible Resource Market: The Case of Storable Pollution Permits,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(551), pages 116-144, March.
- Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2008. "Market power in an exhaustible resource market: The case of storable pollution permits," Documentos de Trabajo 329, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Boutabba, Mohamed Amine & Beaumais, Olivier & Lardic, Sandrine, 2012. "Permit price dynamics in the U.S. SO2 trading program: A cointegration approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 714-722.
- Wirl, Franz, 2009. "Oligopoly meets oligopsony: The case of permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 329-337, November.
- Benjamin Leard, 2013. "The Welfare Effects of Allowance Banking in Emissions Trading Programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(2), pages 175-197, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Williams).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.