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Addressing Strategic Uncertainty with Incentives and Information

Author

Listed:
  • Marina Halac
  • Elliot Lipnowski
  • Daniel Rappoport

Abstract

A principal privately contracts with a set of agents who then simultaneously make a binary decision. Each contract specifies an individual allocation and the information the agent is given about a fundamental state and other agents' contracts. We study the principal's optimal scheme that induces a desired action profile as the unique rationalizable outcome. Our main result reduces this multiagent problem to a two-step procedure where information is designed agent-by-agent: the principal chooses a fundamental-state-contingent distribution over agent rankings and, separately for each agent, the agent's information about the realized ranking and fundamental states. We illustrate with a team-production application.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2022. "Addressing Strategic Uncertainty with Incentives and Information," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 112, pages 431-437, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:112:y:2022:p:431-37
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221087
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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