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Is the Partisan Divide Real? Polarization in Preferences for Redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • Brad Nathan
  • Ricardo Perez-Truglia
  • Alejandro Zentner

Abstract

There is a widespread belief that Republicans and Democrats are worlds apart with respect to their preferences for redistribution. However, is that partisan divide real? In this paper, we discuss evidence from the General Social Survey and a tailored survey. We also discuss a revealed-preference measure constructed with administrative data. We conclude that the partisan divide is more nuanced than previously thought.

Suggested Citation

  • Brad Nathan & Ricardo Perez-Truglia & Alejandro Zentner, 2022. "Is the Partisan Divide Real? Polarization in Preferences for Redistribution," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 112, pages 156-162, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:112:y:2022:p:156-62
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221070
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3886/E154801V1
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    Cited by:

    1. de Bresser, Jochem & Knoef, Marike, 2022. "Eliciting preferences for income redistribution: A new survey item," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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