IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejpol/v15y2023i4p295-322.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Karsten Müller

Abstract

Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically looser before elections, particularly during economic expansions. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain, regulators are closely tied to politicians, and institutions are poor. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to "lean against the wind."

Suggested Citation

  • Karsten Müller, 2023. "Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 295-322, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:295-322
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200626
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20200626
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3886/E163121V1
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20200626.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/pol.20200626.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/pol.20200626?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Florian Léon & Laurent Weill, 2024. "Elections hinder firms' access to credit," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(1), pages 73-107, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:295-322. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.