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Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control

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  • Vincent Anesi
  • Peter Buisseret

Abstract

We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about politicians' characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work argues that voters cannot achieve their first-best payoff. This is attributed to inherent deficiencies of the electoral contract, including voters' inability to precommit, and the restriction to a binary retention-replacement decision. We provide conditions under which voters can, despite these constraints, obtain arbitrarily close to the first-best payoff in an equilibrium of the electoral interaction. Our paper resolves that there need not be a trade-off between selection and control.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Anesi & Peter Buisseret, 2022. "Making Elections Work: Accountability with Selection and Control," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 616-644, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:616-44
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200311
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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