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Dynamic Capital Tax Competition under the Source Principle

Author

Listed:
  • Till Gross
  • Paul Klein
  • Miltiadis Makris

Abstract

We explore the short- and long-run implications of tax competition between jurisdictions, where governments can only tax capital at source. We do this in the context of a neoclassical growth model under commitment and capital mobility. We provide a new theoretical perspective on the dynamic capital tax externalities that emerge in this model. Numerically, we show that the net capital tax externality is positive in the short run but converges to zero in the long run. We also find that noncooperative source-based capital taxes are initially positive and slowly decline toward zero.

Suggested Citation

  • Till Gross & Paul Klein & Miltiadis Makris, 2022. "Dynamic Capital Tax Competition under the Source Principle," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 365-410, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:365-410
    DOI: 10.1257/mac.20190340
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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