An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information
AbstractThe authors study two-player, pie-splitting games in which one player knows the pie and the other knows only its probability distribution. The authors compare treatments in which incentive-efficient strikes (disagreements) are possible with alternatives in which efficiency forbids strikes. They find that incentive-efficiency is very helpful in explaining when strikes occur. There is also evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the subjects' altruism and in their risk preferences. This means that the common-knowledge assumptions of game theory cannot be controlled in experiments; but in the authors' experiments the main theoretical conclusions seem robust to violations of these assumptions. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 81 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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