This paper presents a general-equilibrium model in which all prices and quantities transacted are the direct choices of econom ic agents: there is no Walrasian auctioneer. Multiple subgame perfect equilibria exist with prices and wages at their Walrasian levels. Among the equilibrium allocations are the Walrasian ones, but there a re also outcomes in which price- and wage-taking workers are rationed in the labor market and are unable to sell all the labor they want a t the prevailing wage. This involuntary unemployment results from sel f-fulfilling expectations of inadequate excess demand as in some inte rpretations of Keynes's ideas. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.
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