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Queues, Rations, and Market: Comparisons of Outcomes for the Poor and the Rich

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  • Sah, Raaj Kumar

Abstract

This paper presents a positive comparison of the outcomes of several alternative allocation systems (the queue system, convertible and nonconvertible rations, and the unhindered market) to distribute the limited quantity of a deficit good among heterogeneous individuals. The authors show that, for the poor, the ranking of systems (from better to worse) is: convertible rations, nonconvertible rations, the queue system, and nonintervention. The rich are found to be better off under nonintervention than under other systems. These and other results are notably robust not only to many parameters of the economy, but also to certain types of commodity taxes and administrative costs. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 77 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 69-77

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:1:p:69-77

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Cited by:
  1. Leitzel, Jim, 1998. " Goods Diversion and Repressed Inflation: Notes on the Political Economy of Price Liberalization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 255-66, March.
  2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership," MPRA Paper 6095, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 May 2006.
  3. Bennett, John & Dixon, Huw David, 1995. "Macroeconomic equilibrium and reform in a transitional economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1465-1485, October.
  4. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
  5. Kulshreshtha, Praveen, 2007. "An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 530-548, July.
  6. Jeremy Clark & Bonggeun Kim, 2007. "Paying vs. waiting in the pursuit of specific egalitarianism," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 486-512, July.
  7. Souche, St├ęphanie & Raux, Charles & Croissant, Yves, 2012. "On the perceived justice of urban road pricing: An empirical study in Lyon," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1124-1136.
  8. Ralph Bradburd & Stephen Sheppard & Joseph Bergeron & Eric Engler, 2004. "The Impact of Rent Controls in Non-Walrasian Markets: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach," Department of Economics Working Papers 2004-05, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised May 2005.
  9. Alexeev, Michael & Sabyr, Lyaziza, 2004. "Black markets and pre-reform crises in former socialist economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-12, March.
  10. Christoph Starke, 2012. "Serving the many or serving the most needy?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 365-386, December.
  11. Christoph Starke, 2010. "Serving the Many or Serving the Most Needy?," FEMM Working Papers 100002, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  12. Bennett, John, 1998. "Prices versus quantities and distributional inefficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 63-67, January.
  13. Michael Sattinger, 2002. "A Queuing Model of the Market for Access to Trading Partners," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 533-548, May.
  14. Djajic, Slobadan, 1999. "Shortages, Hoarding and Parallel-Market Premia in an Economy with Administered Prices," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 1-10, February.
  15. St├ęphanie Souche & Charles Raux, 2006. "Perception of the fairness of pricing," Post-Print halshs-00109055, HAL.
  16. Amal Sanyal, 2004. "Bribes in a Supply Line," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71, pages 155-168, 02.
  17. Michael Alexeev & James Leitzel, 1999. "Income Distribution and Price Controls: Targeting a Social Safety Net During Economic Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 281, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.

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