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Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey

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  • Ceren Baysan

Abstract

I evaluate randomly varied neighborhood exposure to information campaigns regarding either executive performance, or increases in executive power, prior to a Turkish referendum on weakening checks and balances on the executive. The campaigns increased voter polarization over the referendum, and subsequently changed party affiliation in national and local elections over the next two years, leading to partisan polarization. My results suggest that, when voters disagree on whether increasing executive power is a good policy, more information can increase voter polarization. Finally, I conclude that because potential polarization is often ignored, the impact of information campaigns on civil society is underestimated.

Suggested Citation

  • Ceren Baysan, 2022. "Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(11), pages 3528-3546, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:112:y:2022:i:11:p:3528-46
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201892
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sergei Guriev & Daniel Treisman, 2019. "Informational Autocrats," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 100-127, Fall.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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