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Mediation in Reputational Bargaining

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  • Jack Fanning

Abstract

Can an uninformed mediator improve outcomes in a dynamic reputational bargaining model? I show that a simple communication protocol used by professional mediators, of announcing an agreement only if both parties privately accept its terms, can increase the payoffs of rational bargainers, but only if communication is noisy: the mediator must sometimes fail to suggest a deal even when both bargainers accept it.

Suggested Citation

  • Jack Fanning, 2021. "Mediation in Reputational Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(8), pages 2444-2472, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:8:p:2444-72
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191321
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Bonev, Petyo & Matsumoto, Shigeru, 2022. "An empirical evaluation of environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution methods," Economics Working Paper Series 2208, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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