IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v111y2021i7p2247-74.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Market Fragmentation

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Chen
  • Darrell Duffie

Abstract

We model a simple market setting in which fragmentation of trade of the same asset across multiple exchanges improves allocative efficiency. Fragmentation reduces the inhibiting effect of price-impact avoidance on order submission. Although fragmentation reduces market depth on each exchange, it also isolates cross-exchange price impacts, leading to more aggressive overall order submission and better rebalancing of unwanted positions across traders. Fragmentation also has implications for the extent to which prices reveal traders' private information. While a given exchange price is less informative in more fragmented markets, all exchange prices taken together are more informative.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Chen & Darrell Duffie, 2021. "Market Fragmentation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(7), pages 2247-2274, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:7:p:2247-74
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200829
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20200829
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20200829.appx
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20200829.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/aer.20200829?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Estelle Cantillon & Aurélie Slechten, 2023. "Market Design for the Environment," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jason Allen & Milena Wittwer, 2023. "Centralizing Over-the-Counter Markets?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(12), pages 3310-3351.
    3. Simone Alfarano & Albert Banal-Estañol & Eva Camacho & Giulia Iori & Burcu Kapar & Rohit Rahi, 2024. "Centralized vs Decentralized Markets: The Role of Connectivity," Working Papers 1420, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Marzena Rostek & Ji Hee Yoon, 2021. "Exchange Design and Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2887-2928, November.
    5. Justin Cox & Kathleen P. Fuller & Robert Van Ness, 2024. "Where does ex‐dividend trading occur: An examination of trading venues around dividends," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 31-55, February.
    6. Suchismita Mishra & Le Zhao, 2021. "Order Routing Decisions for a Fragmented Market: A Review," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(11), pages 1-32, November.
    7. Justin Cox & Bonnie Van Ness & Robert Van Ness, 2022. "The dark side of IPOs: Examining where and who trades in the IPO secondary market," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 1091-1126, December.
    8. Lou, Youcheng & Rahi, Rohit, 2023. "Information, market power and welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120479, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Guo, Wen & Liu, Xiaorui, 2022. "Market fragmentation of energy resource prices and green total factor energy efficiency in China," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:7:p:2247-74. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.