IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v107y2017i5p186-90.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pandora's Auctions: Dynamic Matching with Unknown Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Fershtman
  • Alessandro Pavan

Abstract

Matching theory typically assumes that agents know their values for possible partners and confines attention to settings in which matching is either static, or driven by population dynamics. In many environments of interest, instead, dynamics originate in the agents learning their preferences through interactions with other agents. In this short paper, we illustrate how platforms can use appropriately designed auctions to account for the joint value of experimentation and cross-subsidization in dynamic matching markets. The model is a stylized version of the general one in Fershtman and Pavan (2016).

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Fershtman & Alessandro Pavan, 2017. "Pandora's Auctions: Dynamic Matching with Unknown Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 186-190, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:186-90
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171043
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20171043
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=LDq8hpp_SVAFrs5ER-cRALVCVi6_9doK
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=BgVXUwUCJuXgQy2d23KbbVYHYWBgwd7D
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Jullien & Alessandro Pavan & Marc Rysman, 2021. "Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects," Post-Print hal-03828345, HAL.
    2. Daniel Fershtman & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Matching auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 32-62, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:186-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.