Opportunism And Efficiency Of Contractual Relations In Russian Corporations

Issues related to research of the corporate sector efficiency are extremely important because it is the corporations, which act as a nucleus of almost any economic system. Efficiency of the corporations is largely due to internal corporate quality interactions, i.e. the level of contractual relations efficiency. In the existing economic literature, the questions of contractual relations efficiency still lack sufficient investigation. The present article examines the efficiency of the contractual relations and the factors affecting it, as well as problems of opportunism in Russian corporations and its impact on the contractual relations efficiency. In the graphic models presented, the efficiency curves of contractual relations and opportunism are described; the major factors that reduce the contractual relations efficiency in corporations are highlighted. The article examines the impact on the contractual relations efficiency of quality of corporate institutes. The basic corporate institutes and their key features are allocated. A quantitative analysis of the contractual relations efficiency, by building production functions of Cobb-Douglas, is conducted; this analysis introduces indicators characterizing the dividend policy and the level of remuneration for management personnel as factors.