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Teachers and performance pay in 2014: first results of a survey

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  • Marsden, David

Abstract

From the autumn of 2014, a new performance pay scheme was introduced for school teachers in England and Wales. It makes pay progression for all teachers dependent upon their performance as evaluated by their line managers by means of performance appraisals. This paper reports the results of a the first wave of a survey of teachers’ views about performance pay and their beliefs about its effects on their performance and that of their schools before the first decisions about pay awards under the new scheme. Further surveys are planned to follow the scheme over time. School leaders were also surveyed. The results so far confirm a broadly negative view among teachers as to the desirability and likely motivational effects of linking pay progression to performance, but they also show a more positive view of the process of performance appraisal. The results are compared with those of a similar CEP survey carried out in 2000 just before the previous scheme was introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Marsden, David, 2015. "Teachers and performance pay in 2014: first results of a survey," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61030, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:61030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marsden, David & Belfield, Richard, 2006. "Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 22871, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Victor Lavy, 2009. "Performance Pay and Teachers' Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1979-2011, December.
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    6. David Marsden, 2004. "The Role of Performance-Related Pay in Renegotiating the “Effort Bargain†: The Case of the British Public Service," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 57(3), pages 350-370, April.
    7. Esther Duflo & Rema Hanna & Stephen P. Ryan, 2012. "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1241-1278, June.
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    9. Atkinson, Adele & Burgess, Simon & Croxson, Bronwyn & Gregg, Paul & Propper, Carol & Slater, Helen & Wilson, Deborah, 2009. "Evaluating the impact of performance-related pay for teachers in England," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 251-261, June.
    10. Howard Glennerster, 2002. "United Kingdom Education 1997--2001," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 18(2), pages 120-136, June.
    11. Marsden, David, 2000. "Teachers before the 'threshold'," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3641, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Karthik Muralidharan & Venkatesh Sundararaman, 2011. "Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 39-77.
    13. Howard Glennerster, 2001. "United Kingdom Education 1997-2001," CASE Papers case50, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.
    14. Michael J. Podgursky & Matthew G. Springer, 2007. "Teacher performance pay: A review," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 909-950.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compensation packages; payment methods; public sector labor markets; compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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