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Graduated sanctioning, endogenous institutions and sustainable cooperation in common-pool resources: An experimental test

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  • Fijnanda van Klingeren
  • Vincent Buskens

Abstract

To encourage long-term cooperation in social dilemmas such as common-pool resources, the importance of sanctioning is often stressed. Elinor Ostrom advocates graduated sanctioning: the severity of a defector’s punishment is dependent on the extent of their history of deviant behaviour. In addition, endogenously chosen sanctioning is argued to induce cooperation due to a higher legitimacy. This study compares the effect of graduated and strict mutual sanctioning on cooperation in common-pool resources at the micro and macro level. In addition, we distinguish whether the type of mutual sanction is exogenously determined or endogenously chosen. A Common-Pool Resource game is used in a laboratory experiment, integrating crucial elements of social structure and rule-making mechanisms within a common. Results support the effectiveness of graduated sanctioning compared to strict sanctioning in the long term and partial support using endogenously chosen sanctioning mechanisms versus imposed sanctioning mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Fijnanda van Klingeren & Vincent Buskens, 2024. "Graduated sanctioning, endogenous institutions and sustainable cooperation in common-pool resources: An experimental test," Rationality and Society, , vol. 36(2), pages 183-229, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:36:y:2024:i:2:p:183-229
    DOI: 10.1177/10434631231219608
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