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Worker Trust in Management and Delegation in Organizations
[“Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring,”]

Author

Listed:
  • Kieron J Meagher
  • Andrew Wait

Abstract

Using a unique employee–establishment survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee’s trust of management and their decision-making rights (delegation). We utilize both fixed effects (FE) and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishment-level FE control for management quality, practices, culture, and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited trust in management, and trust of equivalent workers in a different but similar country address the possible endogeneity of employee trust. Across all specifications, we find that delegation to a worker is more likely if that employee trusts management. In our preferred model, which includes establishment FE and accounts for endogeneity, we find a 1 standard deviation (SD) increase in employee trust increases delegation by approximately 0.6 of 1 SD. Our results are robust to the inclusion of worker preferences for individualism (which favors delegation), incentives/bonuses, and alternative measures of decision authority. (JEL D23, L22, L23).

Suggested Citation

  • Kieron J Meagher & Andrew Wait, 2020. "Worker Trust in Management and Delegation in Organizations [“Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring,”]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 495-536.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:36:y:2020:i:3:p:495-536.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewaa008
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Dan & Meagher, Kieron J. & Wait, Andrew, 2022. "Market conditions and firm morality: Employee trust in the honesty of their managers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 89-106.
    2. Keefer, Philip & Vlaicu, Razvan, 2024. "Employee trust and performance constraints in public sector organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    3. Kieron Meagher & Andrew Wait, 2023. "Trust in management in organizations," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 507-507, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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