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The role of public-private partnerships in local infrastructure : the case of carbon offset projects

Editor

Listed:
  • Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé

Author

Listed:
  • Teichmann, Dorothee

Abstract

Investment in low carbon infrastructure is considered an important component of the fight against climate change. The mechanisms of climate regulation (such as carbon offsets) transfer to project developers the risks associated with reducing emissions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, i.e. operational and technological risk, or risks associated with the environmental monitoring and the regulatory mechanism itself. The success of projects depends importantly on the risk sharing arrangements between the private and public partners. It is shown that the delegation of tasks between the partners can create risks that affect the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of the project. For a sample of landfill gas flaring projects financed under the Clean Development Mechanism, it is shown that the outsourcing of the provision of technology creates additional risks. The outsourcing of the development of the official project documentation required by the UNFCCC and the separation of the operation of the landfill and the CDM project development appear to be manageable by risk sharing arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Teichmann, Dorothee, 2011. "The role of public-private partnerships in local infrastructure : the case of carbon offset projects," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/8201 edited by Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé.
  • Handle: RePEc:dau:thesis:123456789/8201
    Note: dissertation
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    File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/8201/1/12-01-17_Diss_Final_Version_D_TEICHMANN.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer," EIB Papers 5/2005, European Investment Bank, Economics Department.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    3. Walls, Margaret, 2003. "How Local Governments Structure Contracts with Private Firms: Economic Theory and Evidence on Solid Waste and Recycling Contracts," Discussion Papers 10707, Resources for the Future.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cormier, Alain & Bellassen, Valentin, 2013. "The risks of CDM projects: How did only 30% of expected credits come through?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 173-183.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    partenariats privé-public; infrastructure locale; gestion des déchets; Mécanisme pour un Développement Propre; changement climatique; théorie des contrats; Public-private partnerships; local infrastructure; waste management; Clean Development Mechanism; climate change; contract theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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