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Why Do Regimes Arise and Persist? Belarus and the Theory of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson

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  • Andrzej Pieczewski
  • Aliaksandra Sidarava

Abstract

The Eastern European state of Belarus, a former Soviet republic, is classified as a pure autocracy, and 2024 marks three decades since its strongman leader Alexander Lukashenko came to power. Over the years, Lukashenko has created a unique type of economy synergistic with the political system and known as “state capitalism.” In this paper, we refer to the theories of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson to explore the factors and institutions that facilitated Lukashenko’s rise to power and ensure the durability of the Belarusian authoritarian system. We found that the case of Belarus is unique and holds relevance for post-Soviet studies, deviating in some respects from Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory, especially regarding the dictator’s ascent to power and the factors sustaining the system. We hypothesise that culture and mental models were crucial for Lukashenko to take power, while the system’s persistence is, in large part, due to the dictator’s external protector, Russia. We use historical analysis and evaluate economic and institutional development indicators.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrzej Pieczewski & Aliaksandra Sidarava, 2024. "Why Do Regimes Arise and Persist? Belarus and the Theory of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 19-33.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2024:i:1:p:19-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 173-192, Spring.
    2. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31, February.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293, March.
    4. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    5. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change," Introductory Chapters, in: Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press.
    6. Aslund,Anders, 2013. "How Capitalism Was Built," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107026544.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Belarus; political regime; culture; institutions; Acemoglu and Robinson;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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