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Win, lose, or draw in the fog of civil war

Author

Listed:
  • J Michael Greig

    (Castleberry Peace Institute, University of North Texas, USA)

  • T David Mason

    (Castleberry Peace Institute, University of North Texas, USA)

  • Jesse Hamner

    (Castleberry Peace Institute, University of North Texas, USA)

Abstract

Civil war outcome studies have used expected utility logic to identify factors that affect actors’ estimates of the probability of victory, the payoffs from victory vs defeat, and the accumulated costs of fighting until victory is achieved. Tests have used static measures of national attributes and war characteristics, measured prior to the war or at its end. We use UCDP Georeferenced Event Data from 73 civil conflicts in Africa to estimate how changes in government and rebel tactical choices on where and when to fight battles affect expected utility estimates and, therefore, civil war outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • J Michael Greig & T David Mason & Jesse Hamner, 2018. "Win, lose, or draw in the fog of civil war," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(5), pages 523-543, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:35:y:2018:i:5:p:523-543
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894216649343
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wood, Reed M., 2014. "From Loss to Looting? Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for Violence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 979-999, October.
    2. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    3. Patrick Brandt & T. David Mason & Mehmet Gurses & Nicolai Petrovsky & Dagmar Radin, 2008. "When And How The Fighting Stops: Explaining The Duration And Outcome Of Civil Wars," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(6), pages 415-434.
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