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Intrapersonal price discrimination and welfare in a dominant firm model

Author

Listed:
  • Manel Antelo

    (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
    ECOBAS)

  • Lluís Bru

    (Universitat de Les Illes Balears)

Abstract

In a homogeneous good industry composed of a dominant firm and a fringe of followers that can choose non-linear pricing contracts to sell the good, we demonstrate that only the dominant firm uses them. Compared with the standard dominant firm model in which only linear pricing contracts are feasible, the dominant firm supplies an inefficiently low number of customers as a way to extract more surplus, since the alternative for customers is a fringe cluttered by excess demand. Thus, allowing market-power firms to deploy non-linear pricing contracts leads to market segmentation, and customers end up worse off than under linear pricing contracts. Fringe firms, in contrast, are better off since they end up charging a higher price for the good. Finally, aggregate welfare under non-linear pricing increases (decreases) as compared to linear pricing if the dominant firm’s share of production capacity is (is not) large enough.

Suggested Citation

  • Manel Antelo & Lluís Bru, 2024. "Intrapersonal price discrimination and welfare in a dominant firm model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 141(2), pages 163-188, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:141:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-023-00847-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-023-00847-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dominant firm; Competitive fringe; Linear and non-linear contracts; Price discrimination; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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