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Introducing the Moral Foundations of Capitalism in Undergraduate Business Law and Ethics Courses Using Kelo v. City of New London

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  • Laura Rae Dove

    (Troy University)

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  • Laura Rae Dove, 2016. "Introducing the Moral Foundations of Capitalism in Undergraduate Business Law and Ethics Courses Using Kelo v. City of New London," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 87-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1287
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lopez Edward J. & Jewell R. Todd & Campbell Noel D., 2009. "Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 101-135, April.
    2. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1995. "An Economic Analysis of Takings," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 64-86, April.
    3. Miceli,Thomas J., 2011. "The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107005259.
    4. Munch, Patricia, 1976. "An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(3), pages 473-497, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sean Alley & Mark Melichar, 2021. "Examining the Impact of Economics Education on Young Americans’ Attitudes about the Economy and Economic Institutions," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 36(Winter 20), pages 21-44.

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