Different Number of Bidders in Sequential Auctions
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DOI: 10.15057/hje.2022004
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Hikmet Gunay & Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar, 2024. "Experiments on the Different Numbers of Bidders in Sequential Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers 2024-530, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
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More about this item
Keywords
Sequential auctions; efficiency; global bidder;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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