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Board independence and analysts' forecast accuracy: R&D perspective

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  • Rahman, Anisur
  • Talukdar, Bakhtear
  • Fan, Zaifeng Steve

Abstract

Research and development (R&D) activities are essential for firm growth and profitability. However, R&D activities also exacerbate information complexity in the financial markets. Therefore, the accuracy of earnings forecasts suffers when R&D expenses are high. This study aims to examine whether board independence can mitigate the adverse effect of high R&D expenditure on analysts' forecasts. Using a sample of 11,645 annual observations from 1997 to 2016, we find that board independence improves analysts' forecast accuracy for R&D-intensive firms. The improvement is more pronounced in firms with low analyst coverage and powerful CEOs. These results are robust with an alternative measure of information asymmetry, a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) model and a quasi-natural experiment based on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to address endogeneity concerns.

Suggested Citation

  • Rahman, Anisur & Talukdar, Bakhtear & Fan, Zaifeng Steve, 2023. "Board independence and analysts' forecast accuracy: R&D perspective," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:127:y:2023:i:c:s0148619523000292
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2023.106136
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Board Independence; Information complexity; Analyst forecast; R&D;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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