From Eurorealism to Europhilia? The 2021 Dutch Elections and the New Approach of the Netherlands in EU Politics
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DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13390
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References listed on IDEAS
- Simon Otjes, 2021. "The EU Elephant: Europe in the 2021 Dutch General Elections," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 56(2), pages 70-75, March.
- Browne, Eric C. & Franklin, Mark N., 1973. "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 453-469, June.
- Peter Roozendaal & Madeleine Hosli & Caspar Heetman, 2012. "Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 447-467, December.
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