Recent Advances in Research on Hedge Fund Activism: Value Creation and Identification
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DOI: 10.1146/annurev-financial-111914-041751
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Cited by:
- Margarethe Wiersema & Albert Ahn & Yu Zhang, 2020. "Activist hedge fund success: The role of reputation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(13), pages 2493-2517, December.
- Ryan Flugum & Matthew E. Souther, 2020. "External monitoring and returns to hedge fund activist campaigns," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 97-140, January.
- Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Brav & Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, 2019. "Dancing With Activists," NBER Working Papers 26171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gillan, Stuart L. & Nguyen, Nga & Nishikawa, Takeshi, 2023. "Heterogeneity in shareholder activism: Evidence from Japan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
- Brav, Alon & Jiang, Wei & Ma, Song & Tian, Xuan, 2018.
"How does hedge fund activism reshape corporate innovation?,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 237-264.
- Alon Brav & Wei Jiang & Song Ma & Xuan Tian, 2016. "How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?," NBER Working Papers 22273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aguilera, Ruth & Bermejo, Vicente & Capapé, Javier & Cuñat, Vicente, 2021. "The systemic governance influence of universal owners: evidence from an expectation document," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118899, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Flugum, Ryan & Howe, John S., 2020. "Hedge fund activism and analyst uncertainty," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 206-227.
- Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Nguyen, Phuong L. & Galpin, Neal & Twite, Garry, 2022. "New active blockholders and adjustment of CEO relative incentive ratios," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
- Krishnan, C.N.V. & Partnoy, Frank & Thomas, Randall S., 2016. "The second wave of hedge fund activism: The importance of reputation, clout, and expertise," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 296-314.
- An, Ran & Huang, Lawrence (Hong), 2021. "Political influence in hedge fund activism: Causal evidence from U.S. gubernatorial election," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1).
- Bessler, Wolfgang & Vendrasco, Marco, 2022. "Corporate control and shareholder activism in Germany: An empirical analysis of hedge fund strategies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- Danis, András, 2020. "Shareholder activism with strategic investors," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(C).
- Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Brav, Alon & Jiang, Wei & Keusch, Thomas, 2020. "Dancing with activists," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 1-41.
- Yang, Huan, 2021. "Institutional dual holdings and risk-shifting: Evidence from corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Caselli, Stefano & Gatti, Stefano & Chiarella, Carlo & Gigante, Gimede & Negri, Giulia, 2023. "Do shareholders really matter for firm performance? Evidence from the ownership characteristics of Italian listed companies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
- Zhan Li, 2021. "The factor market spillover effects of shareholder activism," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 671-689, September.
- Matsusaka, John G. & Ozbas, Oguzhan & Yi, Irene, 2017. "Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions," Working Papers 262, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
More about this item
Keywords
corporate governance; productivity; shareholder activism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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